The current and short-term risks landscape described in Chapter 1 may be exacerbated in terms of severity as the world moves towards 2035 – unless we collectively act on such foresight today and work collaboratively across all stakeholder groups towards a more promising future. This chapter focuses on the longer-term horizon, outlining survey results for the likely impact of risks in the next 10 years and providing in-depth assessments of three risk themes – pollution, biotech and super-ageing societies. The chapter concludes with a retrospective analysis of findings from the last two decades of Global Risks Reports.

The GRPS suggests that the road to 2035 will be challenging to navigate. Respondents are far less optimistic about the outlook for the world over the longer term than the short term. As noted in the Key findings section, 62% of respondents to the GRPS predict a turbulent or stormy outlook over the next 10 years (Chapter 1, Figure A).

Comparing the two- and 10-year timeframes in more detail reveals a markedly deteriorating global risks landscape. All 33 risks surveyed increase in severity score over the long term compared to the short term, reflecting respondents’ concerns about the heightened frequency or intensity of these risks over the course of the 10-year horizon (Figure 2.1).

Environmental and, to a lesser degree, technological risks dominate the long-term global risks landscape according to the GRPS. In fact, nearly all environmental risks are included in the top 10 (Figure 2.2). Extreme weather events are anticipated to become even more severe, with the risk ranked first over the next decade for the second year running. Biodiversity loss and ecosystem collapse ranks #2, up from #3 last year and with a significant deterioration compared to its two-year ranking (#21). Critical change to Earth systems at #3, Natural resource shortages at #4 and Pollution at #10 complete the very bleak outlook for environmental risks.

Technological risks fare little better than environmental risks over the next 10 years. Adverse outcomes of AI technologies follows Biodiversity loss and ecosystem collapse as one of the risks expected to increase in severity the most from the two-year to the 10-year timeframe, ranking #6 on the 10-year risk outlook compared to #31 on the two-year risk outlook.

Societal risks round out the top 10 on the 10-year horizon. Inequality (wealth, income) stands at #7, followed by Societal polarization at #8. This is an important pair of risks to watch, given how related they can be to bouts of social instability, and to both domestic political and geostrategic instability. In super-ageing societies, such as Japan, South Korea, Italy or Germany, unfavourable demographic trends could accentuate these societal risks over the next 10 years. Pensions crises and labour shortages in the long-term care sector are likely to become acute problems, with no easy fix for governments. Section 2.5, Super-ageing societies explores this risk theme.

Economic risks fall mostly in the bottom half of the 10-year risk ranking and have remained relatively stable compared to last year’s survey. But as Section 2.6, Looking back: 20 years of the Global Risks Report shows, economic risks tend to be volatile over time – meaning that an economic crisis should not be ruled out over the next 10 years. One significant area of concern is Crime and illicit economic opportunity, which has increased 16 positions year-on-year to #15 in the 10-year ranking.

Geopolitical risks, despite topping the immediate- term ranking and featuring among the top 10 in the short-term ranking are noticeably absent from the top 10 rankings when it comes to the outlook for the next decade. Nonetheless, State-based armed conflict has increased from #15 last year to #12, and there has been an uptick in the Biological, chemical or nuclear weapons risk by seven positions to #19. State-based armed conflict remains a long-term concern for respondents from the Middle East and Northern Africa in particular; this is the only region with a geopolitical risk in the top five (Figure 2.3).

The overall 10-year risk outlook has remained relatively stable compared to last year’s Global Risks Report, suggesting that little has been achieved when it comes to risk mitigation or solutions. Extreme weather events (#1), Natural resource shortages (#4), Misinformation and disinformation (#5), Adverse outcomes of AI (#6) and Pollution (#10) rank identically compared to last year’s edition. However, when it comes to Pollution, it is noticeable that younger survey respondents are especially concerned, with the under 30s age group ranking it at #3. There is also divergence across stakeholder groups in how Pollution is ranked, with government respondents civil society and academia placing Pollution as a top 10 risk, but not the private sector or international organizations (Figure 2.4).

Section 2.3, Pollution at a crossroads explores under-appreciated pollutant risks that are likely to become more top of mind by 2035, given their significant impacts on health and ecosystems.

Unless concrete action is taken today to address polluting activities, these impacts will only worsen.

Looking further down the 10-year risk ranking (Chapter 1, Figure G), many positions have remained stable year-on-year, including Concentration of strategic resources and technologies (#13), Censorship and surveillance (#14), Asset bubble bursts (#30), Inflation (#32) and Non-weather related natural disasters (#33) as the lowest-ranked risk. Adverse outcomes of frontier technologies (#23) has also remained relatively stable, increasing just one position since last year’s report. The risks that have seen the biggest falls in their 10-year ranking compared to last year’s report are Intrastate violence, down seven positions to #29 and Decline in health and well-being, down eight positions to #28.

The latter three risks – Adverse outcomes of frontier technologies, Intrastate violence, and Decline in health and well-being – are all related to Section 2.4, Losing control of biotech?, which provides an in-depth analysis of risks in the sector. Advances in biotech are leading to increasingly fast progress in medicine and explain, perhaps, some of the increased optimism regarding the Decline in health and well-being risk. But this progress comes alongside new low-probability, but high- impact risks. These include interstate or Intrastate violence from biological terrorism, and Adverse outcomes of frontier technologies involving accidental or malicious misuse of gene editing technologies or of brain-computer interfaces.

In last year’s Global Risks Report, we introduced the concept of Structural forces into our analysis of global risks. Four spheres – technological, geostrategic, climatic and demographic – continue to form the backdrop to the global risks that will play out over the next decade and beyond.

We define these Structural forces as the longterm shifts in the arrangement of, and relationships between, the systemic elements of the global landscape. These forces have the potential to materially impact the speed, spread or scope of global risks, and will in turn be influenced by each other. We are continuing to witness how these structural forces are converging, accelerating and creating instability in societies, economies and institutions. If left unaddressed, they could steer our world toward an increasingly fractured and unsustainable path.

The four Structural forces are summarized in Box 2.1. They are Technological acceleration; Geostrategic shifts; Climate change; and Demographic bifurcation. While all four forces have global ramifications, some, such as climate change, are more multi-directional in their development, which could allow for several potential futures. Similarly, while all represent longer-term shifts to the structural landscape, some have the potential to manifest more quickly due to underlying variables. Geostrategic shifts, for example, may lead to further divergence between leading powers, while technological acceleration can foster new discoveries that transform systems rapidly. As the results of the GRPS show, the Structural forces’ influence on the global risks landscape is well underway.

Pollution ranks #10 in the GRPS 10-year risk ranking, with 23% of respondents expressing maximal concern (Figure 2.5). Moreover, it is noticeable that younger survey respondents are especially alarmed, with the under 30s age group ranking it at #3 in the 10-year risk ranking. In 2024, six of the nine “planetary boundaries” for environmental health were crossed, with a seventh boundary in jeopardy.1 These boundaries contribute to the stability of the world’s life- support system, including our economies and societies. Unsustainable patterns of production and consumption are driving climate change, Pollution, and biodiversity loss, referred to by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) as the Triple Planetary Crisis. Pollution is the world’s largest environmental risk factor for disease and premature deaths, and its impacts are unequal, with 92% of Pollution-related deaths and the greatest burden of related economic losses occurring in low- and middle-income countries.

Pollution poses greater risks in specific geographies and disproportionately affects vulnerable groups of the population that are exposed to higher levels of Pollution. Marginalized communities, urban areas and industrial zones bear the large brunt of its impacts due to proximity to sources of emissions, including waste disposal sites, and often limited green spaces. These disparities create further inequities in healthcare access and burden, as well as in economic costs.

By 2035, the compounded effects of Pollution threaten to erode ecosystem resilience, diminishing its ability to sustain life and deliver essential services. Decline in health and well-being (Figure 2.6) is increasingly associated with pollutant exposure, including the rising incidences of cardiovascular diseases, respiratory conditions, infertility rates and cancer.

Anthropogenic activities are key drivers of all types of Pollution. These activities are expected to increase further over the next decade unless a different course of action is taken. Some polluting activities and pollutants are addressed under climate adaptation and mitigation efforts, including the drive towards net-zero greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. However, there is a concerning common denominator of many countries’ green transition pathways: explicit, comprehensive plans for tackling the mounting health and ecosystem impacts of Pollution are missing.

Economies globally are at different stages of the green transition. In the EOS, executives were asked to identify the top five risks most likely to pose the biggest threat to their respective country in the next two years. While Pollution (air, water, soil) ranks #18 of the 34 global risks, it emerges as the #1 concern in Central Asia and as a leading concern in Southern Asia (#6) and among lower-middle income economies (#11). At the country level, Pollution ranks among the top three risks in 10 countries, including Malta, Azerbaijan, Ghana, and Kosovo.

Particularly in densely populated countries such as Bangladesh (#3) and India (#4), Pollution has become one of the most critical challenges to tackle (Figure 2.7).

A Pollution-conscious green transition is needed. Some of the pollutants that must be accounted for in that transition are newer or emerging, not well understood, or do not yet have enough evidence of their potential impacts. Different pollutants tend to come under the regulatory spotlight only as our awareness of their profound long-term impacts on health and ecosystems grows. Better understanding these pollutants and their impacts is a first step towards both targeted policies and adaptive strategies. The pollutants can be analysed within the lenses of air, water and land - even though, once introduced, they do not remain confined to a single environmental domain but create complex, interdependent impacts.

Air pollutants include particulate matter (PM), ozone, nitrogen dioxide, sulphur dioxide and carbon monoxide. Exposure to air pollutants is a particularly

severe health risk for vulnerable populations, including children, pregnant women, people with pre-existing or chronic health conditions, and the elderly.6 Air Pollution also significantly reduces work productivity, leading to increased sick days and commensurate economic losses.7 Like Pollution overall, air Pollution impacts societies unequally, with people in lower and middle-income countries exposed to higher risks.8 In 2024, people in the most polluted areas of the world were found to be breathing air at least six times more polluted than those in the least polluted areas.

Short-lived climate pollutants (SLCPs), known as “super pollutants”, are a group of pollutants that remain in the atmosphere for a relatively short period of time in comparison to longer- lived GHGs.10 However, these pollutants have a disproportionately higher impact on air quality and global warming. SLCPs include mainly black carbon, methane, hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) and tropospheric ozone. They are responsible for up to 45% of near-term global warming.11 Speed is crucial for incorporating SLCP reductions into a Pollution- conscious green transition.

Black carbon

Black carbon, more commonly known as soot, is a SLCP that consists of tiny black particles that can be carried for thousands of kilometres. It is a component of PM, specifically PM2.5, which is formed by the incomplete combustion of fossil fuels. Its particles can penetrate the bloodstream through the alveoli in lungs to transport toxic compounds around the body. PM2.5 has been linked to a wide range of health implications, including chronic respiratory conditions, strokes, heart attacks and cancer, as well as to early childhood development issues and long-term effects on cognition and health. The particles of black carbon also affect the ecosystem by increasing plant surface temperature, interfering with rainfall and diminishing sunlight, which has a significant effect on crop losses each year.

Black carbon contributes to accelerating the melting of ice and snow in polar and mountainous areas. Tackling black carbon is a “win-win” for both air Pollution and climate, as it is a particle that is up to 1,500 times stronger than carbon dioxide (CO2) per unit of mass.15 While atmospheric warming is an emerging area of research on black carbon, any efforts to tackle the reduction of black carbon offer a quicker solution when combined with ongoing reduction of CO2.

Sources of black carbon vary from region to region and include sectors such as energy use (commercial and residential), industrial production, agricultural burning, combustion-powered cookstoves, and forest wildfires. Addressing black carbon emissions has the potential to slow the rate of warming of the climate by up to 50% worldwide and up to two-thirds in the Arctic,16 and can be achieved through cost-effective, affordable measures.

Methane

Methane is a powerful SLCP with a warming potential over 80 times that of CO2 over a 20- year period, which makes it a major contributor to climate change. The main sources of methane emissions include fossil fuels, agriculture and waste. Methane has a relatively short atmospheric lifetime of approximately 12 years, which means that efforts to reduce methane can yield relatively rapid climate benefits.It is a major precursor to ground- level ozone, an air pollutant that poses health risks, decreases agricultural yields, and stresses ecosystems.

Failure to reduce methane emissions is recognized as one of the most significant short-term risks for limiting near-term global temperature rise.21 The Global Methane Pledge (GMP), supported by 159 countries, has set an ambitious target to cut global methane emissions by 30% by 2030 from 2020 levels.22 Meeting the GMP has the potential to reduce warming by at least 0.2 °C by 2050 and annually prevent 26 million tons of crop losses, 255,000 premature deaths, 775 thousand asthma- related hospitalizations and 73 billion hours of lost labour due to extreme heat.

Per- and Polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS)

Per- and Polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS), also known as “forever chemicals” are used in consumer products to make them water, grease or stain resistant. They are useful in many industries, and are now being detected in our drinking water, soil, air and food. They pose a significant threat to people’s health, as they do not easily break down, and are toxic at extremely low levels.

Exposure to certain levels of PFAS can lead to significant health impacts, including decreased fertility in women, developmental delays in children, increased risk of certain cancers and reduced ability of the body to fight infections.25 Governments are increasingly showing concern over the impacts of PFAS Pollution, and regulations are emerging to limit human exposure.

Micro- and nanoplastics

The world is currently producing more than 430 million tonnes of plastic annually. Each year, 19 million tonnes of plastic waste leak into the environment – 13 million onto land and six million into rivers and coastlines. Plastic does not biodegrade, and over 99% of plastic is directly derived from fossil fuels. Plastic Pollution in aquatic environments includes Pollution from shipping and fishing.

Microplastics – pieces of plastic of less than five millimetres wide – include plastics originally manufactured to be that size (‘primary microplastics’), for example microbeads, industrial plastic powders and pellets, but also pieces of plastic that have resulted from the degradation and fragmentation of larger items, for example plastic bottles, synthetic textiles and tyres. The World Health Organization (WHO) concludes that although further work is required to understand the impacts of microplastics on human and biodiversity health,30 their presence has been detected both in our bodies and in the air, causing rising concern.

Microplastics also affect the soil ecosystem and restrict the growth of plants, both in marine and freshwater settings. Nanoplastics – pieces of plastic even smaller than microplastics at 100-1,000 nanometers wide – are an emerging area of high risk, as there is an increased chance of them being ingested, inhaled or absorbed.

Chemicals present in plastics are endocrine disrupting, interfering with hormone actions in the body. These chemicals can be released during the entire life cycle, with more than 13,000 chemical substances identified. This is an area of emerging research and concern given that endocrine- disrupting chemicals are linked to significant health effects including infertility, obesity, cancer, thyroid problems and developmental issues.

Pharmaceuticals

Pharmaceutical Pollution falls into the category of “contaminants of emerging concern”, alongside personal care products, sunscreen, insect repellents and detergents, which all tend to be long-lived and therefore accumulate at low levels over long periods of time in the environment. While pharmaceuticals have been well-established as water pollutants for decades, it is only recently that the extent and nature of that Pollution is starting to be assessed. This is currently an unregulated category of pollutants.

Antimicrobial resistance in both people and animals is in part associated with antimicrobials entering water bodies, along with overuse and misuse of antimicrobials. Antimicrobials are medicines that are used to treat infections in people, animals and plants and include a range of antibiotics, antivirals, antifungals and antiparasitics. Antimicrobials, when released into water from manufacturing waste, healthcare facilities, farming, and directly from consumers (both people and animals), can remain in the environment. Globally, there is insufficient awareness of and incentives among manufacturers and users of antimicrobials for sparing usage and correct disposal. The WHO issued guidelines on antimicrobial Pollution from medicines manufacturing in September 2024, aimed at providing a basis for better practices and regulation.

Nitrogen

Industrial agriculture has long been dependent on nitrogenous fertilizers to increase productivity. This has resulted in nitrogen Pollution becoming a major contaminant of soil, water and air. A key part of the problem is that the more these fertilizers are used to increase crop yields, the more is lost to the environment, escaping into water and the atmosphere, the latter as ammonia.

If groundwater becomes contaminated with nitrogen it can become a health issue. For example, high nitrate levels in drinking water can cause reproductive problems, methemoglobinemia, colorectal cancer, thyroid disease and neural tube defects. Nitrogen in rivers flows into the sea causing eutrophication of coastal waters, a phenomenon generating various seawater health issues. Recent evidence shows that eutrophication is a problem that is on a worsening trend.

Livestock manure and fertilizers in agriculture are responsible for 81% of ammonia emissions into the air globally. That contributes to 50% (in the EU) and 30% (in the United States) of PM2.5 air Pollution, causing chronic illnesses that can lead to premature mortality. Livestock manure and fertilizer use also leads to nitrous oxide production, a potent GHG, and the most important substance for the depletion of the stratospheric ozone layer, with implications for the increased occurrence of skin cancer.

Waste disposal

Waste can be categorized by origin (e.g. municipal solid waste or industrial waste), character (e.g. hazardous waste or organic waste) or type (e.g. e-waste or healthcare waste). Improper waste disposal can lead to the spread of infectious diseases, the release of methane, and exposure to Pollution from chemicals released through landfills, organic waste, and burning of waste. For example, exposure to improperly managed e-waste and its components can release a wide range of different chemical particles into the environment, which can have multiple adverse health and developmental impacts, especially in young children and pregnant women.

Without urgent action on waste management, by 2050 its global annual cost – factoring in both the direct cost and the hidden costs of Pollution, ill health and climate change from poor waste disposal practices – could almost double from $361 billion to $640 billion.

A. Improve monitoring, reporting and evaluation systems

For many emerging pollutants, such as nanoplastics, there is a lack of reliable data on health risks including reproductive and developmental toxicity and longer-term effects of low-level exposures. The GRPS finds that the approach with the third-highest potential for driving action on risk reduction and preparedness regarding Pollution over the next 10 years is Research and development (Figure 2.8). However, a lack of real-time data or a unified system for reporting, both nationally and internationally for many pollutants makes it difficult to measure, monitor and act. There must be an improvement of the current monitoring, reporting and evaluation (MRE) systems to identify and understand emerging risks of pollutants and track progress over time.

By improving existing MRE systems and sharing protocols, stakeholders can inform policy decisions, enhance transparency on pollutants and increase targeted interventions on Pollution sources and their impacts.

B. Strengthen regulatory frameworks

To mitigate the health and ecosystem impacts of pollutants, more holistic and pre-emptive regulatory action is needed. Actions taken today can reduce the impacts of Pollution to 2035. According to a report by UNEP, approximately one-third of countries worldwide lack legally mandated standards for outdoor air quality.42 A Pollution- conscious future requires building upon and strengthening regulatory frameworks to include and address well-established pollutants, but also new and emerging challenges. National and local regulations is identified by GRPS respondents as the approach with the most potential for driving action on risk reduction and preparedness regarding Pollution over the next 10 years (Figure 2.8). Effective regulation requires adaptive policies informed by ongoing scientific research.

C. Unlock ambitious funding

Chronic underfunding of initiatives on Pollution persists. For example, less than 1% of all international development funding ($17.3 billion) was expressly committed to targeting outdoor air Pollution between 2015 and 2021. Large- scale, integrated and private-public-philanthropic collaborative action on funding is required for Pollution prevention at local, national and international scale. Innovative funding mechanisms will be required to address the transboundary nature of Pollution. For example, international financial institutions and multilateral development banks can further support Pollution mitigation efforts by providing concessional loans or grants.

One specific area requiring more funding is technological solutions. Many existing technologies make certain types of Pollution mitigation not only feasible, but economically advantageous by creating healthier environments and improving human health. Examples include improving waste management with advanced filtration systems and proper segregation at source, and methane capture technologies. Deploying current technologies widely and immediately, while continuously refining approaches as data improves, sets the foundation for a healthier, sustainable and resilient future.

Governments can incentivize the integration of such technologies into industrial practices. Public-private collaboration in this area to unlock ambitious funding can help turn Pollution challenges into opportunities.

Adverse outcomes of frontier technologies, including biotech, is one of the risks with the sharpest rise in GRPS ranking between the two- year and 10-year time horizons, by ten positions to #23. This divergence shows that, while global risks stemming from the field of biotech are not top of mind today, they will become more so within a decade. There are three sets of risks in biotech that need to be watched closely over the coming years: Rising accessibility of bioweapons; negative health impacts as the flipside of efforts to cure or prevent health issues; and the potential for those with access to leading-edge biotech to cross ethical boundaries.

In each of these three areas, the first warning signs are already emerging. Risks will grow over time and become more complex as further rapid technological progress is made. Advances in biotech are being supercharged by convergent technologies such as AI and machine learning approaches, streamlining the ability of both legitimate researchers and threat actors to make sense of large datasets.

Regional and national responses in the EOS reveal pockets of heightened concern around Adverse outcomes of frontier technologies, including biotech. Several nations, such as Qatar, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Switzerland and Demark, assign this risk relatively high significance, reflecting their unique geopolitical or economic priorities. High-income regions exhibit moderate concern overall, whereas emerging economies have lower short-term rankings for this risk but may face rising exposure as technology adoption accelerates (Figure 2.10).

These risks come alongside tremendous new opportunities for breakthrough improvements not only in health, but also well-being, as well as agriculture, the development of new building materials, mining and many other areas.44 Within a decade, products made using synthetic biology will permeate our societies much more than today, and the tech-driven bioeconomy will play an increasingly important role in climate-change mitigation.46 The scope of opportunities related to human genome editing, specifically, accelerated following the award in 2020 of the Nobel Prize in Chemistry to Emmanuelle Charpentier and Jennifer Doudna for their development of Clustered Regularly Interspaced Short Palindromic Repeats - associated protein 9 (CRISPR-Cas9), a technology that allows for precise cuts in DNA to modify genetic code.

Genome editing technologies, including CRISPR-Cas9, have already been used to treat gene-related diseases such as sickle cell disease and haemophilia, among others. There has also, for example, been recent success in treating an inherited condition that causes vision loss in childhood. Gene editing technologies are also used in some areas of research into cancer and viruses such as HIV, and there is hope that CRISPR-Cas9 could be used to counter antibiotic resistance. Overall, some 2,000 gene therapies are under development worldwide. Many of these will become available within a decade, representing previously unthinkable progress. Eventually, gene therapies may become seen as an obvious choice to protect against disease, as vaccinations are today.

Significant progress is taking place in another promising field: brain-computer interfaces. The first people suffering from quadriplegia have received brain implants connecting their neural signals to digital devices. Further, alternative technology (in several cases with sensors attached to the outside of the head and neck) is being applied to facilitate communication between the brain and artificial limbs, benefiting, for example, war veterans or people with motor neurone disease.

Risk perceptions around Adverse outcomes of frontier technologies are likely in part to reflect the fear that militaries and terrorists will continue to pursue new uses of biotech as more potent and stealth forms of weaponry. Attaining and building out biotech leadership is likely to rise up the agendas of leading militaries. Over the next decade, biotech- based weapons could also become increasingly integrated with other (non-biological) weaponry.

Cyber espionage and warfare, and Biological, chemical or nuclear weapons and hazards used in combination have far greater, compounding impacts than when used on their own.

Advances in AI-driven biotech will make biological weapons easier and cheaper to develop over the next decade. The weapons themselves could be made more harmful than previous versions. Or, they could be different to those previously built in that they might eventually be focused on specific target groups of people based on genetic characteristics, leaving other people unharmed.

Over the next decade there is also a risk that non-state actors could develop such weapons, increasing the severity of future terrorist attacks. One area of particular concern is dual use of AI models: In a laboratory experiment reported in 2022, an AI system that had previously been used for medicinal drug discovery was trained to find and combine toxicity molecules. Within only six hours, 40,000 compounds at least as toxic as the sample nerve agent had been generated. Theoretically, there is an unlimited number of new toxic substances that could be created using such models. The researchers involved in the experiment emphasized that the computing power and software required for such experiments is easily attainable today.

Experts are also warning about the relative ease with which viruses capable of infecting humans, such as monkeypox or smallpox, could be enhanced to evade human immune systems, making standard vaccines ineffective. With the tools and information required to alter a pathogen’s genetic code becoming easier to access, it may only be a matter of time before a threat actor releases a virus that causes the next pandemic.

As the costs of setting up a laboratory and purchasing the necessary equipment are relatively limited, the main barrier to threat actors misusing advances in biotech is having the scientific expertise itself – a barrier that will be far from insurmountable over the next decade. Of course, it will also take considerable (and unrelated) expertise to translate the creation of new toxic substances into the building of weaponry, given the complexities of transporting and disseminating the substances created. But unlike in the nuclear sector, where strict protocols and monitoring of materials and equipment make proliferation efforts relatively easy for governments to detect, this set of conditions is not present in the same way when it comes to weaponizing biotech.

Biotech can also provide a bridge from the biological world to the cyber realm. As far back as 2017, researchers in the United States demonstrated that it was possible to hack a computer using DNA sequence data. Under certain preconditions, they were able to introduce malware into DNA purchased online (at minimal cost), which was read and then processed by a computer that in turn became compromised by the malware. Looking ahead a decade, as Cyber espionage and warfare becomes more sophisticated and more people become acquainted with biotech developments, it is conceivable that the researchers’ warning – that hackers could use the DNA sequences from faked blood samples to gain access to hack computers – could come true. Indeed, GRPS respondents express concern with the risk interconnection between Adverse outcomes of frontier technologies and Cyber espionage and warfare, as shown in Figure 2.11 below.

Beyond modifying biological agents and creating new ones for bioweaponry and terrorism, over the coming years there will be other opportunities to misuse – accidentally or on purpose – technologies for editing DNA and applying that to human cells (as well as animals, plants and ecosystems). Part of the trouble with human genome editing technology is that it is too new to predict its long-term effects on both the individuals being treated and future generations.

Problems can arise at the time an individual is receiving gene editing therapy. These may involve a range of clinical complications or off-target effects (which are very common for CRISPR-Cas9). In some gene editing processes, an individual’s genome is subject to significant rearrangements, which have the potential to generate other health issues, such as cancer or even new genetic diseases that are not yet understood by scientists and doctors.

In 2018, twins with the genomes of their embryos edited to be resistant to HIV were born in China. The case remains unique in the world – as far as is publicly known – and caused ethical controversy at the time. The twins were guaranteed anonymity by the Chinese government and so there has not been any publicly available tracking of their subsequent health status. The case demonstrates the reach of the technology, and other such surprise announcements by state or non-state actors cannot be excluded over the next decade.

Although it may still be generally perceived to be a low-probability risk today, there only needs to be one instance of nefarious application of human genome editing (possibly in an unregulated or non-professional environment) for serious consequences to result, perhaps involving loss of control with cascading health impacts.

Other areas of biotech present health risks that are also still somewhat opaque. For now, the risks associated with brain-computer interfaces appear distant, but this could change over 10 years. One category of risks is of a clinical nature, involving possible damage to the brain if the medical intervention is not carried out correctly or in case of complications. A growing number of individual biohackers are already implanting various small devices in different parts of their bodies, some of which they intend to link to the internet. These operations are often undertaken at considerable risk to themselves. If this trend catches on, it could lead not only to unforeseen medical complications for some of the individuals involved, but ultimately also to a world in which person-to-person connections start being replaced by permanent person-machine connectivity, partially divorced from physical reality. The COVID-19 pandemic highlighted the devastating impact of lessening face-to-face interaction; developments such as this have the potential to magnify that.

The wide variety of applications of genome editing, from enhancing health or performance to editing foetuses, leads to difficult ethical questions around where the use of these technologies should stop. For example, would it be ethical to apply gene editing to change a child’s eye or skin colour, to modify height or, if that were to become possible, to increase intelligence? What might be unintended consequences, in current or future generations, of editing genes and entire genomes in these ways?

The societal consequences also bear consideration. There is a risk of a future world in which a select global few have access to and use human genome editing technology to become stronger, healthier and happier, with the rest of the population – which over a 10-year timeframe is still likely to be the vast majority – unable to afford it. Gene therapy treatment, such as CAR-T therapy (an immunotherapy for cancer) for one person can easily cost half a million dollars or more for the therapy alone. The limited access to such technologies is likely to represent another source of Inequality, exacerbating Societal polarization and political tensions.

Inequality and ethical considerations will increasingly also play out among countries. The concentration of biotech innovation among a few dominant biotech companies and countries could result in limited access to everyone else. This could leave low-income economies vulnerable due to limited awareness and expertise. The interconnection between Adverse outcomes of frontier technologies and the Concentration of strategic resources and technologies, observed in the EOS, highlights this risk.

The push for rapid progress will also increasingly test ethical boundaries in the domain of brain- computer interfaces. As more people opt for having a brain-computer interface, the time is likely to come over the next decade when demand will arise for the technology from those who are interested in enhancing the performance of their brains, potentially augmenting their own knowledge or productivity with an AI “add on”. At some point in this chain of developments, serious risks will emerge. The digital device to which the individual is connected may be able to “read” the thoughts of the individual, compromising privacy. This could represent a substantive form of control over the individual by whoever is managing the connected device and its online content, whether that controller is an organization or the state. The individual might only be able to reverse the situation by having the implant removed.

All stakeholders should act today to safeguard human development and ecosystems over the coming decade and beyond, allowing the benefits of biotech to be reaped while limiting the scope for adverse impacts. Specific areas to focus on are:

A. Build a global set of norms

The pace of change in the sector is so fast that regulators globally struggle to keep up. Rising geopolitical tensions suggest that the political will for a comprehensive cross-border agreement on acceptable uses of biotech is unlikely to be present for some time, posing an ongoing challenge. But ultimately, intergovernmental agreements will be required to keep biotech risks under control. If one or more countries deviate from ethical and technical protocols, there is every chance that malicious or accidental developments in biotech will quickly become a problem for other countries, as well. As part of such a new framework, a global ethical oversight body should be established, consisting of individuals respected worldwide for their humanity and ethical positions, as well as top minds on biotech itself who are able to keep abreast of cutting-edge Research & development and help to direct government efforts in this regard. Research & development was listed by GRPS respondents as the top approach for mitigating risks from Adverse outcomes of frontier technologies (Figure 2.12).

Pending such an intergovernmental agreement, which could take years, a less ambitious objective for the short term would be to establish and agree on a set of broad norms to guide government policies on biotech worldwide. Leading bioethics experts have emphasized the importance of broad-based dialogue across societies to help establish such norms. Regarding human genome editing specifically, progress has already been made in this regard: the WHO in 2019 established an expert advisory committee to examine the scientific, ethical, social and legal challenges associated with it. The committee in 2021 published a framework for governance covering the key applications of human genome editing as well as a set of recommendations. This is helpful guidance for countries, many of which do not yet have a legal framework covering all human genome editing applications.

B. Empower people through biotech education

Biosafety rules exist and are strictly adhered to in most countries when it comes to recognized institutions undertaking work on gene editing. They include, for example, storage requirements, design of laboratories, protocols to safeguard the health of researchers and measures to prevent the escape of organisms into the environment. However, individuals and communities that are outside of recognized institutions, and who are experimenting with biotech also need to be made aware of and adhere to these biosafety rules.

In the years ahead, understanding the risks in the field of biotech is going to become increasingly important at an individual level. Misinformation and disinformation around biotech is a serious problem, with biohackers who are not medical professionals touting health remedies or performance-enhancing procedures based on biotech. As these uses of biotech become more ubiquitous, individuals will need to gain a more nuanced understanding of when it can be helpful to them, and when it may pose a danger to their health. A collaborative educational effort between the public sector, companies in the Biotech sector, and educational institutions should be launched to deepen citizens’ understanding of the technology and its risks.

C. Incentivize biotech leaders to work in the public sector

The public sector needs to continue to focus on making it attractive for the leading minds in the Biotech sector to work there, amid stiff competition from large pharma or technology companies, biotech startups or academia. The only way that regulators will be able to keep up with developments in biotech over the next decade will be to attract these top minds – if not into full-time employment then at least in the form of regular and intensive dialogue.

Countries are termed “super-ageing” or “super- aged” when over 20% of their populations are over 65 years old.68 Several countries have already exceeded that mark, led by Japan and including some countries in Europe. Many more countries across Europe and Eastern Asia in particular are projected do so by 2035. Globally, the number of people aged 65 and older is expected to increase by 36%, from 857 million in 2025 to 1.2 billion in 2035.

By 2035, populations in super-ageing societies could be experiencing a set of interconnected and cascading risks that underscore the GRPS finding that the severity – albeit not the ranking – of the risk of Insufficient public infrastructure and social protections is expected to rise from the two-year to the 10-year time horizon (Figure 2.13). An ongoing concern is that government funding for public infrastructure and social protections gets diverted during short-term crises.

Some super-ageing societies could be facing crises in their state pensions systems as well as in employer and private pensions, leading to more financial insecurity in old age and exacerbated pressure on the labour force, which includes a growing number of unpaid caregivers. Indeed, super-ageing societies by 2035 are likely to face labour shortages.

Ranked second globally according to the EOS, Labour and talent shortage is selected as the top risk in Europe and Eastern Asia, where super- ageing is most pronounced. Twenty-one countries place the risk in first place, including two of the most super-ageing societies, Japan and Germany, while 40 other economies view it as one of the top five risks (Figure 2.14).

The long-term care sector will be especially affected by labour shortage. Care occupations are expected to see significant demand growth globally by 2030. Care systems – health care and social care – in super-ageing societies are already under clear and immediate strain. They will struggle to serve a fast-growing population over 60 years of age that has additional care needs while recruiting and retaining enough care workers. Care systems are, in great part, funded by governments and account for about 381 million jobs globally – 11.5% of total employment. The accumulation of debt and competing spending needs on, for example, security and defense are likely to constrain the reach and sustainability of public expenditure on care systems over the next decade. Without increased public or blended investment, care demand will continue to be unmet.

Economies already experiencing this challenge are resorting to stop-gap measures, including attracting migrant care workers from other economies. But if this turns into a talent drain from countries with more youthful societies, those countries may then struggle to reap the benefits of their demographic dividend and will, several decades from now, run into super-ageing society challenges of their own.

There will be no easy solutions to this problem set, given the sustained strength to 2035 of the two underlying trends generating higher average dependency ratios, not only across super-ageing societies, but at the global level: declining fertility rates and rising life expectancy, though not necessarily in better health.

Over the next decade the pensions crises and their implications will start hitting home in super- ageing societies, as it becomes clear that current state pension systems were designed for a much younger demographic with fewer years of retirement that needed funding. But it is not only state pension systems that will be struggling.

Many employees are moving from Defined Benefits to Defined Contribution schemes – putting the onus on the individual to come up with strategies for saving over a lifetime. However, for many people this can be challenging as they may have insufficient income, lack the requisite financial understanding, or fail to make good early decisions about savings and retirement.

As dependency ratios rise, fewer people will be contributing to employer and private pensions schemes relative to the number of people whose retirements need funding, and with the length of those retirements rising. This will put pressure on institutional pension funds, some of which may seek to increase their returns by allocating higher proportions of their assets to riskier investments, such as crypto assets, private credit or other alternative investments. These riskier investments will not always pay off, and over time this could worsen the already suboptimal funding ratios of some of these institutions. If there are extended periods of market underperformance, this could lead to many more individuals facing shortfalls in funding their retirement.

The pension gaps in super-ageing societies will be exacerbated by the long-term impacts of the rise of the “gig economy” and the associated failure to make sufficient pensions contributions during periods of gig work. Pension shortfalls will also disproportionately affect lower-income workers who have not managed to make significant savings during their careers, even if they have been fully employed. In the EU, for example, already today one in five elderly people face the risk of poverty or social exclusion and this figure is set to rise by 2035.

Women on average have significantly higher pensions gaps than men given time taken out of formal employment over the course of their careers to care for children or elderly relatives, as well as their lower average pay compared to men. In the EU, women’s pensions are nearly 30% lower than those of men, meaning that they are at a 35% higher risk of poverty.

The societal implications of Insufficient public infrastructure and social protections, such as pensions and care systems, are shown in Figure 2.15, which reveals that Inequality was selected by GRPS respondents as a significant connected risk.

A common proposal for alleviating the pensions crisis in super-ageing societies is raising the statutory retirement age, and in some countries this has already occurred. However, attempts to do this to the extent needed to stem the pension crises will face resistance from voters, a rising proportion of whom are themselves close to retirement. This segment of the population tends to have high voter turnout, making it increasingly likely that policy outcomes will be in their favour. Intergenerational tensions could become an ongoing feature of super- ageing societies, with discontented younger working cohorts resenting being called upon to pay more towards funding retiree pensions.

There is also a gap between what global executives believe needs to be done to adjust pension schemes and what they view as businesses’ responsibilities. One-quarter of global executives (25%) support policy changes to pension schemes and retirement ages, but a lower share (14%) of executives view such measures as an effective business practice for expanding their talent base, as reported in the World Economic Forum's Future of Jobs Report 2025. This illustrates the complexity of aligning key stakeholder interests behind pension reforms.

Even if official retirement ages can be increased, the impact on reducing the scale of the pension crises may be smaller than hoped for. Some people do not manage to work to their expected retirement age, as their working lives are cut short by illness or disability, job loss or other reasons. The inability to extend retirement age is an especially significant risk for people in physically demanding jobs. However, many would like to be upskilled or reskilled to be able to extend their careers.

In super-ageing societies, the balance between public sector, private sector and family support in the provision of long-term care is varied. The predominant case globally is that government healthcare and social services, and other government financial assistance for retirees, play important roles. In high-income countries with less of a contribution by the public sector, more of a role is played by private insurance, private care facilities, and home care services.

Given the rising demand for its services, the care sector overall is set to need many more workers by 2035. In the United States, for example, demand for long-term care services and support workers alone is projected to grow by 44% from 2020-2035.81 This rising demand needs to be set against an environment in which staff are often underpaid and overworked. Unless long-term care providers can find ways to improve pay and working conditions, the risk of labour shortages in the sector will only rise. Market forces can lead to more private-sector provision of long-term care filling some of the void. However, for many families, paying for private long-term care will remain out of reach financially.

Immigration into super-ageing societies is already playing a role in addressing the sector’s labour needs. However, migrant workers are overrepresented in the less regulated areas of the care economy, such as home-based care and domestic work, and earn nearly 13% less than the national average. The political climate around immigration is strained and may become more so over the coming years, with anti-immigration policies becoming more mainstream in several super-ageing societies.

Similarly, over a 10-year timeframe, there is only so much that increased labour-force participation in super-ageing societies can contribute to addressing the long-term care crunch. Attracting more women to enter the formal workforce can play a role. However, the balance of incentives available to women needs rethinking for there to be a meaningful change in female labour-force participation. Women currently provide two-thirds of unpaid work worldwide, which keeps 708 million of them from joining the labour force.

Without meaningful transformation of the care sector and its resourcing, the scope for either immigration or increased labour force participation to solve the long-term care crunch over the next 10 years remains limited. Governments and companies may be tempted to turn to technology in an effort to increase sectoral productivity. This can involve everything from automated reminders to take pills, to chatbots responding to medical queries and robots delivering meals, ideally freeing up time for more social interactions wherever possible. But while these and other technologies may help optimize care delivery and reach, demand for care skills and jobs is likely to be far from fully met by technological innovation

While today’s super-ageing societies are the ones that will feel the brunt of the negative impacts of demographic trends on their economies and societies over the next decade, ripple effects will be felt worldwide, leading to risks elsewhere, too. Global economic growth over the next decade is likely to be constrained by demographics in super- ageing societies, many of which are among the world’s largest economies. In addition, there are likely to be direct knock-on impacts from today’s super-ageing societies. Despite policy pushback on immigration in the short-medium term, in the longer term the need to fill labour shortages could be decisive in shaping policy. As a consequence, countries with more youthful populations will face the risk of depletion of their own future workforces as many more young, working-age people migrate to super-ageing societies to help fill labour shortages there. Working-age people who remain in the super- ageing societies of the future could be left hard- pressed to sustain the rest of the populations there.

Many countries with youthful demographics are in Sub-Saharan Africa, which has by far the highest fertility rate globally.84 These demographics will help sustain rising working-age populations for several decades. But a key challenge over the next decade will be to generate employment opportunities on a sufficient scale and that offer job security. The International Labour Organization (ILO) notes that 72% of young adult workers (aged 25 to 29) in the region are in a form of work deemed “insecure”. Limited investment in human capital, which is essential to developing an attractive economy that can generate sufficient employment opportunities, is a significant risk.

Societies that are young today and looking at positive demographic trends for the next decade or more could ultimately follow similar demographic trajectories to the super-ageing societies of today and will then face problems that could be even more complex. While this risk may play out fully only over several decades, eventually low-income, super-ageing societies of the future could face

a perfect storm – all the social and economic problems associated with today’s super-ageing societies but without fully developed social safety nets in place, and without the pools of private savings accumulated by some in today’s super- ageing societies.

A. Further encourage flexible work policies

Organizations in both the public and private sectors need to further develop their flexible work policies as part of their Corporate strategies (Figure 2.16), with more options for leaving and coming back to the workforce at different life stages. This will help employees who are taking a non-linear life path, for example, including education, working across different sectors, and professional training or reskilling in the middle of a career, as well as years taken out to care for children or elderly family members before coming back to work.

B. Campaign to improve pre-retirement health choices

A large-scale, multi-faceted public-private effort to improve the health choices of future retirees should be launched. An impactful way to address the long-term care crisis, and to give the elderly the opportunity to contribute productively to the economy, is for individuals to lead healthier lives pre-retirement, thereby diminishing the need for long-term care in the first place. In Singapore, for example, the government is creating a “health district” to help their citizens live healthier, longer lives.88 Such initiatives can include helping people to understand the impacts of building healthy habits early on, focusing on key areas such as exercise, nutrition and social interactions. National and local regulations, the approach cited in the GRPS as having the most potential for driving action on risk reduction and preparedness when it comes to Insufficient public infrastructure and social protections, can play a role in this regard (Figure 2.16). The initiative would have not only an individual dimension, but a patriotic, national- level one, too: By becoming healthier for longer, individuals can contribute to a stronger economy and lower fiscal pressures in the decades ahead.

C. Proactively build social cohesion across generations

At a societal level, all stakeholders need to reconsider the prospect of an inter-generational conflict playing out and take measures today to avoid that. The upcoming demographic shifts could be an opportunity to reframe the conversation.

Every young person will become old, if they are lucky; engaging in more cross-generational social activities could increase life satisfaction for everyone, improve long-term social cohesion and provide real benefits towards resolving a range of global problems. More can also be done to encourage older individuals to remain in the workforce, for example by reskilling and by tailoring jobs more to their skill sets. Corporate strategies (Figure 2.16) also have a role to play: Organizations could consider incentivizing the creation of cross- generational teams.

The first edition of the Global Risks Report was launched in 2006 in a risks landscape characterized by terrorism and concerns around avian influenza, among other risks. Over the course of the 20 editions of the report, we have lived through significant events that have reshaped our economic and societal landscapes, from the 2007-2008 global financial crisis to the COVID-19 pandemic. We have also witnessed the compounding effects of the Structural forces of Technological acceleration, Geostrategic shifts, Climate change and Demographic bifurcation (Box 2.1). These Structural forces are determining long-term shifts in the arrangement of, and relation between, the systemic elements of the global landscape.

Figure 2.17 shows the average 10-year risk outlook rankings of the risks covered in the current edition of the Global Risks Report over the last 20 years and the fluctuations of those rankings over that time period. The figure illustrates how consistently or variably each risk has been perceived over time, as represented by the standard deviation of its ranking. The sections that follow assess further how the 10- year outlooks for key risks and risk categories have changed over the last two decades.

Environmental risks have consistently topped the 10-year ranking

When assessing the evolution of perceptions of the four Structural forces, Climate change is the one that has been most consistently perceived as experiencing a clear ongoing systemic shift. Environmental risks have dramatically increased in ranking over the 10-year time horizon since the introduction of the Global Risks Report in 2006, and in recent years continuously rank as severe concerns. The highest-ranking environmental risks over the last 20 years have been Critical change to Earth systems, Extreme weather events, Natural resource shortages and Pollution, as highlighted in the upper-left quadrant of Figure 2.17. As the effects of Climate change-induced events and developments have become more visible over time, and public awareness of their implications has risen, the rankings of environmental risks have continued to rise.

The clearest example is Extreme-weather events, currently ranked as the #1 risk for the next 10 years. Since 2014, it has consistently ranked as a top 6 risk (Figure 2.18). From 2017-2020 it ranked as the top risk and has retaken that spot since 2024.

The ranking of Extreme weather events has tended to rise as such events have worsened in intensity and frequency. Extreme weather events are becoming more common and expensive, with the cost per event having increased nearly 77%, inflation-adjusted, over the last five decades.90 The effects of climate change-driven Extreme weather events are being felt across the world and often hit the poorest communities the hardest. Global heat records continue to be broken.

The Pollution risk demonstrates shifting prominence over time in the 10-year risk outlook. First introduced in 2009, Pollution risk initially encompassed Air pollution and nanoparticles pollution (paint, cosmetics, healthcare). Over the subsequent 10 years, the risk evolved in concept and rose in perceived importance (Figure 2.19). In 2017, Human-made environmental damage and disasters (e.g. oil spills, radioactive contamination, etc.) ranked #7 and entered the top 10 risks over the 10-year horizon. Ever since, concerns about Pollution, according to our historical GRPS data, have remained a top 10 long-term risk, and this year also ranked #6 over the two-year time horizon.

Among the other environmental risks, Critical change to Earth systems jumped in ranking in the 10-year risk outlook from #21 in 2013 to #4 in 2014 and has been in the top five ever since, aside from 2017 when it was #6. Biodiversity loss and ecosystem collapse has experienced one of the largest increases in ranking among all risks, moving from #37 in 2009 to #2 in 2025.

Perennial worries about conflict

Both State-based armed conflict and Intrastate violence feature in the upper-left quadrant of Figure 2.17, showing that concerns about conflict, although especially high today, have never been far from top of mind among decision-makers over the last 20 years.

Looking deeper into State-based armed conflict, its 10-year risk ranking experienced noticeable upticks in 2010-2011, when it rose from #24 to #7 – perhaps in part because of the start of the Syrian civil war in March 2011. A similar uptick is seen from 2014-2015, as the war in Syria escalated, with heavy casualties.

The heightened long-term risk perceptions have unfortunately been validated by the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and the wars in the Middle East and Sudan, among others. Indeed, State-based armed conflict is the #1 short-term concern today among GRPS respondents. Section 1.3: “Geopolitical recession” notes the growing realization that we are in an era of conflict, without multilateral solutions in sight.

State-based armed conflict is a clear example of the interconnected nature of risks and of their compounding effects. Conflict intensifies humanitarian crises, including Involuntary migration or displacement. Perceptions of this risk in the GRPS have experienced a pattern similar to that of State-based armed conflict, in particular from 2015 onwards.

Societal risks are the third major long-term concern

The third category of risks with a strong presence in the upper-left quadrant of Figure 2.17 is societal risks. Although this risk category has not featured

in every edition of the Global Risks Report, five of the eight risks rank above the average: Inequality (wealth, income), Lack of economic opportunity or unemployment, Societal polarization, Infectious diseases, and Erosion of human rights and/or civic freedoms.

Inequality, Lack of economic opportunity or unemployment, and Societal polarization are the three societal risks that have ranked high consistently. These rankings provided steady indications that we were moving towards a more polarized world. Looking at Societal polarization more closely, it has increased its ranking from #21 when it was introduced in 2012 to #8 this year.

Economic risks are perceived as less of a long- term risk

Looking at Figure 2.17, six economic risks rank below the average over the last 20 years: Disruptions to critical infrastructure, Disruptions to a systematically important supply chain, Crime and illicit economic activity, Economic downturn, Inflation and Concentration of strategic resources (and technologies).

Only two economic risks have presented an above-average long-term threat according to GRPS respondents: Debt (corporate, public, household), which, as shown in Figure 2.20, has remained relatively stable as a long-term risk since the 2007- 2008 financial crisis, and Asset bubble burst.

While Asset bubble burst was one of the top- ranked long-term risks during and in the immediate aftermath of the financial crisis, its ranking subsequently fell off sharply as the global economy regained a stable footing in subsequent years.

Technological acceleration is the structural force to watch

Perceptions of long-term technological risks have been among the most volatile of all the risks considered in the last 20 years of the Global Risks Report. While this can be explained by the current set of technology risks being relatively new to the report, it nonetheless is a warning sign that technological risks might be the area to watch the most for unexpected future risk developments. The impacts of technological acceleration are difficult to assess. Even going back to the first edition of the Global Risks Report in 2006, it was noted that risks associated with new technologies were among those whose outcomes were very unclear.

Over the course of the 20 editions of the Global Risks Report, the category of technology has itself changed frequently, with risks in 2006 related to the Convergence of technologies, Nanotechnology, Electromagnetic fields and Pervasive computing. Such threats have evolved markedly and today the category includes Misinformation and disinformation, Censorship and surveillance, Adverse outcomes of frontier technologies, Adverse outcomes of AI technologies, and Cyber espionage and warfare. Undoubtedly, this categorization will be subject to further significant realignment in the coming years given the pace and range of different possible directions of technological change.